Channel Tunnel fire is second serious blaze

The fire was so serious that it was six months before full tunnel operations could be resumed.

The fire itself was bad enough, with 30 lorry drivers needing hospital treatment after being trapped in a fume-filled compartment of their lorry shuttle train.

But it was the later inquiry report of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority that caused the most consternation.

The authority said that Eurotunnel's system for handling a fire alert was deficient and its weakness was revealed in a major emergency exercise just eight days before the 1996 incident.

Alerting procedures "failed to be fully or properly implemented on a number of occasions" before the November 18 fire, the report added.

As a result there was an 11-minute delay in contacting the first French special firefighting team on the night of the disaster. And the UK back-up team was not contacted for 67 minutes.

The alert procedures were just one of the things that went wrong, the report revealed.
It showed:

:: Five of the first six in-tunnel fire detectors only gave unconfirmed alarms even though four security guards saw flames up to six feet high on the doomed freight train before it entered the tunnel.

:: The on-board fire detectors on the train did not give an early alarm

:: Staff in the rail control centre made "numerous mistakes" and their training was "deficient or ill-adapted for incidents of this type".

:: They failed to halt other trains in the tunnel to prevent smoke and fumes building up.

:: Eurotunnel senior managers failed to act on a July 1996 staff-performance audit that revealed "many areas of concern" in the rail control centre.

:: The supplementary ventilation system was activated too late - about 15 minutes after the fire train had stopped.

:: Essential instructions "were either forgotten, incorrectly applied, applied too late or applied in a different order to that prescribed".

:: It took 13 minutes for Kent Police to receive the message that the fire was being treated as a special bi-nation emergency.

:: The driver of the blazing train did not use his breathing apparatus when he tried to prepare for evacuation.

:: Cross-over doors in the tunnel should have been shut, but were open at the time of the incident.

The report said: "It could be argued, superficially at least, that the safety equipment, staff and procedures worked well enough overall to achieve the main safety objective of ensuring no serious harm to people.

"But a closer analysis of the performance of key staff, emergency procedures and safety equipment raises serious questions as to the safety of the system in these and similar circumstances."