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Army chief tells of mistakes and missed chances in Iraq
Robert Fox23 Jun 2009
Britain missed the opportunity to stabilise Iraq after the invasion of 2003 and was too quick to shift resources to the conflict in Afghanistan, the head of the Army acknowledged today.
General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, said the failure of coalition forces to take advantage of the “window of consent” in the immediate aftermath of the invasion had opened the door to Shia militias.
He said they had not kept enough troops on the ground.
In what was seen as a valedictory speech to the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London, Gen Dannatt, who is retiring shortly, said a key lesson from the conflict was the need to achieve a “decisive effect” early on.
“In Iraq this meant acting while we had a window of consent to address the security and basic needs of the Iraq people — reconstruction, development and developing the capacity of indigenous security forces. Our failure to deliver this through proper investment and a comprehensive approach and our early switch to an economy of force operation in favour of Afghanistan sowed the seeds for the dissatisfaction that followed and the rise of the militias supported so cynically by the Iranians.”
He said the coalition failed to ensure it had enough troops on the ground, “surging” numbers when the situation demanded. “We failed to maintain the force levels required, either of coalition forces or Iraqi forces, particularly towards the end of the campaign.”
Gen Dannatt said mistakes had also been made in deploying Iraqi security forces before they were ready. “We must not repeat the mistakes of 2003 to 2004 when we recruited and deployed hastily security forces of very limited effectiveness and, as it turned out, of questionable loyalty,” he said.
The success of operations in Chose, Sierra Leone, and East Timor showed it would be wrong to abandon completely Tony Blair's doctrine of “liberal intervention”, the general added.
“We should not draw the wrong lessons from Iraq about the efficacy and utility of liberal intervention and stabilisation,” he said. However future interventions should be undertaken only if they could be properly resourced.
